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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID LESLIE FIFE, 
Defendant/Appe11ant 
Case No. 950256-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant David Leslie Fife relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and 
the summary of the argument. Appellant responds to the State's 
answer to his opening brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should review the issue raised in this case 
because it is an issue which is likely to recur and capable of 
evading review. 
The majority of the case law cited by Appellant and the 
State supports Appellant's claim that his rights to due process, 
equal protection and the protection against double jeopardy were 
violated where the trial judge refused to give him credit for 
time served at the state hospital on a determination of 
incompetency. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THIS ISSUE. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
The State is correct that this case presents "an issue 
likely to recur but capable of evading review." State's brief at 
5, citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981). 
An exception to the mootness doctrine is invoked by appellate 
courts "when the case presents an issue that affects the public 
interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief time that 
any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading review." 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989), citing 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d at 899-900. 
The precise issue presented in this case will arise only 
where a defendant is convicted and sentenced for a misdemeanor. 
As demonstrated by this case and acknowledged by the State, "[i]n 
all probability a defendant who has been sentenced for a 
misdemeanor will have finished his sentence by the time his 
appeal is complete." State's brief at 5. In this case, 
Appellant endeavored to resolve this appellate issue quickly by 
submitting stipulated facts rather than waiting for a court 
reporter to prepare a transcript. This case has moved quickly 
through the appellate system. On March 20, 1995, the trial court 
issued the order being appealed. Less than six months later, 
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briefing will have been completed.1 Because this issue is 
likely to recur and is capable of evading review, as evidenced by 
this case, this Court should review the issue. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT CREDIT FOR 
TIME SERVED AT THE HOSPITAL. 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State does not contest Appellant's 
claims that the failure to give him credit for time served at the 
state hospital violates due process and double jeopardy. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 14-18. Instead, the State merely 
argues that the failure to give Appellant such credit does not 
violate equal protection. See State's brief at 7-12. 
Appellant's claim that sentencing a defendant to more 
time than the statutory maximum violates due process and double 
jeopardy is well supported by case law cited in Appellant's 
opening brief at 15-18. The Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Ollerton v. Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah 1974), along with the 
criminal commitment statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 et. seq. ) 
and the United States Supreme Court decision in Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), establish that a criminal 
commitment is part of the criminal proceeding and that an 
1
 Appellant also filed an unsuccessful petition for 
certificate of probable cause and a petition for an extraordinary 
writ in an attempt to obtain the release of Appellant Fife before 
he served the entire 3 65 days in addition to the time he spent 
committed to the hospital. 
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individual who is held under a criminal commitment is "in 
custody" or "incarcerated." Hence, where a criminal defendant is 
"in custody" or "incarcerated" for longer than the statutory 
maximum sentence due to the trial judge's failure to give him 
credit for time served at the hospital, a due process and double 
jeopardy violation occurs. See State v. Cook, 679 P.2d 413 
(Wash. App. 1984); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 
1971). 
In addition, the trial judge violated Mr. Fife's right to 
equal protection by refusing to give him credit for time served 
at the state hospital as part of this criminal case. As 
Appellant pointed out in his opening brief, he was treated 
differently than others who were similarly situated. Criminal 
defendants convicted of class A misdemeanors who are not 
committed to the state hospital as part of the criminal case 
serve a maximum sentence which is 257 days shorter than that 
served by Mr. Fife. Mentally ill persons who are not criminally 
charged would not serve any time under the lesser requirements of 
the criminal commitment statute. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. at 730; Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-234 (1993), § 62A-12-232 
(Supp. 1995). 
The State claims that the equal protection holding of 
State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), does not apply in 
this case because a defendant is ineligible for bail while 
committed to the state hospital. State's brief at 8. The fact 
that a defendant cannot post bail while committed to the hospital 
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actually works in favor of Appellant's argument. The inability 
to post bail establishes that the defendant is in custody as part 
of a criminal case, and that commitment time should therefore be 
counted toward the maximum sentence. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. at 73 0 (equal protection violation may occur where defendant 
is committed under a more lenient criminal commitment statute and 
thereby subjected to longer sentence). 
The State also attempts to distinguish the decision in 
Richards by arguing that the Richards decision was influenced by 
a concern for fairness and that "Richards did not remain in jail 
because of the substantive nature of his crime or his 
dangerousness, but merely because of poverty." State's brief at 
8. Fairness also requires that a criminal defendant whose period 
of being held in custody is extended due to his incompetency to 
proceed be given credit for that time served. Mr. Fife was not 
required to serve the extended time "because of the substantive 
nature of his crime or his dangerousness, but merely because of 
his [incompetency]." Compare State's brief at 8. 
The Richards court did not expressly consider indigency a 
suspect class in reaching its decision. Rather, it recognized 
the unfairness of treating criminal defendants who were otherwise 
similarly situated differently based on indigency. The same sort 
of fairness rationale applies in this situation where criminal 
defendants who are otherwise similarly situated are treated 
differently based on their incompetency. See generally Mental 
Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 Yale L.J. 1237 (1974); 
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Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820, 824 (1st. Cir. 1991) 
(stating that "[t]he indigency that may lead to an inability to 
post bail does not suffice to create a class calling for strict 
scrutiny rather than a rational relationship analysis"); Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 730 (recognizing equal protection 
violation may occur where incompetent criminal defendant 
subjected to different commitment standard). Hence, the concerns 
articulated by the State as the basis for the decision in 
Richards apply equally in this case. 
The State also argues that the differences between 
incarceration at the jail and confinement at the state hospital 
justify the extra length of commitment. State's brief at 8-9. 
Without any record support as to the distinctions, if any, which 
may exist between incarceration at the jail and incarceration at 
the state hospital, the State claims as follows: 
Defendants who are waiting trial are in jail 
for a relatively short period of time. Though 
technically they are not being punished, their 
surroundings are harsh, uncomfortable, and filled 
with the accouterments of prison life. Because 
they are mentally well, they understand their 
circumstances and are fully aware of their 
privations, loss of freedom, and potential of 
conviction and further incarceration. On the 
other hand, the court commits incompetent 
criminal defendants to the Department of Human 
Services where the primary goal is treatment and 
care in a secure setting. Incompetent defendants 
are awaiting trial only in the broad sense that 
the State has charged them with a crime and their 
trial is yet to occur. 
State's brief at 8-9. In reality, such distinctions between 
pretrial incarceration at a jail and pretrial commitment at the 
hospital do not exist. For instance, the amount of time spent at 
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the jail awaiting trial varies dramatically and can involve 
upwards of two years, depending on the charge. The amount of 
time committed to the hospital also varies, but is limited by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(13) (1995) and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. at 738 (a person cannot be held on a criminal commitment for 
more than a reasonable amount of time necessary to determine 
whether there is a substantial likelihood that he will become 
competent in the near future). 
In addition, the state hospital is a secure facility 
which can be just as "harsh, uncomfortable and filled with the 
accouterments of prison life" as a county jail. Some jail 
inmates, particularly those housed in the mental health wing, do 
not "comprehend their circumstances" just as some defendants who 
are committed to the hospital understand their circumstances. 
The generalizations employed by the State in its brief at 8-9 in 
an attempt to make a distinction between the two types of 
commitment are not supported by the record, nor are they 
accurate. 
Furthermore, incompetent defendants are awaiting trial 
just as pretrial jail detainees are awaiting trial. Indeed, the 
only basis for the criminal commitment is the pending criminal 
charge. If it appears that the defendant will not become 
competent in the near future so that he can proceed to trial in a 
timely fashion, the State must initiate civil commitment 
proceedings or release the individual. Any "treatment and care" 
the defendant receives at the hospital is aimed toward restoring 
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competency so that he can be tried on the charge and is not 
directed toward a return to society as a functioning member.2 
Finally, confinement in a secure facility while 
incompetent is designed to ensure the presence at trial of a 
competent defendant. If the goal of such commitment were only 
the restoration of competency, bail would be available and an 
incompetent defendant could seek outpatient treatment or 
incompetent defendants would be housed in nonsecure facilities. 
The rigors of life at the state hospital are just as gruelling, 
if not more so, for many criminal defendants as are the rigors of 
life at jails. 
The State argues further that because the defendant in 
this case had already served one year at the time of sentencing 
in this case, it would have been "anomalous" to give him credit 
for the hospital time because then the State would not be able to 
punish him. This circular reasoning is incorrect for several 
reasons: (1) the State had already punished Mr. Fife by holding 
him on this charge for more than a year; (2) the plea to a 
class A misdemeanor was made following a plea bargain which the 
State could have refused to offer or the judge could have refused 
to allow if it did not provide a suitable punishment; 
(3) criminal defendants regularly enter pleas to misdemeanors for 
2
 There is no evidence in the record as to the "treatment and 
care" a defendant receives at the hospital. Furthermore, a 
defendant housed in the mental health wing of the jail may well 
receive the same "treatment and care." This distinction claimed by 
the State is not a proper basis for deciding this issue. 
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which they are immediately sentenced and given credit for time 
served and the case is cleared; judges do not always place 
defendants on probation or require additional jail time after a 
plea is entered. Regardless of whether the trial judge and 
parties contemplated the expiration of the sentence as the result 
of the plea bargain, due process, double jeopardy and equal 
protection require that result. 
While the State acknowledges that the decision in Reanier 
v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1974), "arguably supports 
defendant's equal protection argument" (State's brief at 11), it 
claims that other cases cited by Appellant do not support his 
claim.3 See State's brief at 11. On the contrary, the cases 
cited by Appellant support his argument that the trial judge's 
refusal to give him credit for time served at the state hospital 
violates his right to equal protection, due process and/or the 
protection against double jeopardy. 
For instance, in Pladson v. State, 385 N.W.2d 406, 409 
(Minn. App. 1986)4, the court recognized that the Minnesota 
"rules of criminal procedure automatically give credit for 'all 
3
 As Appellant outlined in his opening brief, the Utah 
Supreme Court explicitly relied on Reanier v. Smith in reaching its 
decision in Richards. 
4
 In Pladson, the court indicated that the rule did not 
provide for credit for time served pursuant to a civil commitment. 
In State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Minn. App. 1990), the 
court criticized this aspect of Pladson and held that the rules 
required credit for time served in a civil commitment where such 
commitment was "in connection with" the offense charged. 
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time spent in custody in connection with the offense'" and for 
"time spent in a hospital for a competency examination" (emphasis 
added). The Pladson court went on to say that 
In Jackson l"v. Indianal, the Court held that a 
longer confinement may be a denial of equal 
protection because the defendant is subject to a 
more lenient standard of commitment than one not 
charged with a criminal offense. Jd. at 730, 92 
S.Ct. at 1854. It was also held to be a 
violation of due process to commit a defendant 
without a consideration of the grounds for civil 
commitment. Id. at 731, 92 S.Ct. at 1854-1855. 
Pladson, 385 N.W.2d at 409. Because the Minnesota rule refers to 
a competency examination rather than a competency determination, 
the Pladson court took its analysis beyond the rule, relying on 
due process and equal protection for its holding that the 
defendant was entitled to credit for all time served at the 
hospital as part of the criminal proceedings. This supports 
Appellant's claim in this case. 
The constitutional analyses in Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 
1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976), Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp. at 
419-20, State v. Cook, 679 P.2d at 416, and State v. Wietholter, 
636 P.2d 101, 103 (Ariz. 1981), are applicable regardless of 
whether they deal directly with a criminal commitment on a 
determination of incompetency. These cases indicate that double 
jeopardy and due process require that a criminal defendant be 
given credit for all time spent in custody on a crime and that 
the maximum sentence not exceed the statutory maximum penalty. 
The State relies on three cases in support of its 
argument that "three states have upheld a trial court's denial of 
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credit for time served at a state hospital pending a competency 
evaluation." State's brief at 12. Ex parte Parker, 485 S.W.2d 
585, 587 (Tex. Cr. App. 1972), was decided shortly after the 1972 
decision in Jackson v. Indiana and does not cite that decision. 
Instead, the Parker court distinguished North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. 
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989), and relied on cases holding that 
Pearce did require that a criminal defendant be given credit for 
pretrial incarceration. In Campbell v. State, 576 S.W.2d 938, 
947 (Ark. 1979) , the defendant was serving a life sentence 
against which time could not be credited, he did not ask the 
trial court to give him credit, and the court did not consider 
whether a constitutional violation occurred. Dalton v. State, 
362 So.2d 457, 458 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1978), is the only case 
which arguably supports the State's argument. In Dalton, 
however, the court provided no analysis for its decision and did 
not directly address the constitutional issues raised in this 
case. In addition, the Dalton court recognized that the 
standards for civil commitment in Florida "are essentially the 
same as those used in civil commitment proceedings," citing 
inter alia Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Dalton, 362 
So.2d at 458. Because the criminal and civil commitment 
standards in Florida are essentially the same, the Dalton court 
apparently concluded that the constitutional concerns addressed 
in Jackson did not apply. Dalton therefore provides little 
support for the State's position in this case. 
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The overwhelming majority of the case law cited by the 
State and Appellant supports Mr. Fife's claims that the trial 
judge violated Appellant's rights to equal protection, due 
process and the protection against double jeopardy by failing to 
give him credit for time during which he was held at the Utah 
State Hospital. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Fife respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order refusing 
to give him credit for pretrial time confined to the Utah State 
Hospital and remand the case to the trial court for imposition of 
a correct sentence. 
SUBMITTED this IStL day of September, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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